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Dempsey, stated that one of his focus areas when attempting to shape the conditions for the Army of 2020 was the infantry squad. 1 Specifically he noted that the infantry squad is the unit of action that engages in battle with enemy forces at an equal level, or as he characterized it, "a fair fight."
Dempsey noted the significant resources that the echelons above the squad such as the Battalion, Brigade, and Division possess that provide advantage over their opponent, and as the new Chiefof-Staff, he wanted to identify opportunities to transfer that same advantage, or the concept of overmatch, to the infantry squad. The future force would be based on an examination "from the bottom up," as opposed to designing a force looking at Divisions or Brigade Combat Teams, the traditional force structures designed to conduct independent operations. While the idea to examine the structure of the squad, the basic fighting unit of the United States Army, is certainly not a new concept, deciding to focus on the squad as the unit to enable with overmatch is innovative. However, the exact meaning of the term overmatch and the method for an infantry squad to achieve overmatch are unclear.
Since the end of World War II, the United States Army has conducted over twenty studies attempting to determine the optimum composition of an infantry rifle squad, with each study focusing on fielding new weapons and equipment to squads of varying strengths. All studies were composition focused, providing solutions based simply on an adjustment of the composition of the squad -changing the manning or providing the squad with a new piece of equipment. As discussed by many Army leaders, despite the twenty studies conducted the squad of today still operates virtually the same way it did immediately after World War II: using paper maps, line of sight radios, and functioning as part of a larger force. The focus on the composition has not developed a lasting squad with established capacity, thus the necessity to focus on the squad as the Army looks to structure the force in a post-Iraq and Afghanistan context. An alternative method to enhance squad effectiveness, as an approach to enable the formation with overmatch, is to focus on capability, or skills resident in the formation that are primarily a result of training and leadership. In a 1958 Army article, General William DuPuy, observed that while you can see the individuals that make up the squad, the concept that binds those individuals is the organizational ideal jointly held by them all. 2 DuPuy is referring to the human dimension, or conditions that members of a team develop, which increases the capability of the formation. With an increased capability, the composition can vary, but the formation will be better prepared to accomplish its mission.
The solution when attempting to answer how to enable a squad with overmatch will not simply be to adjust the manning or to outfit the squad with another piece of gear. An infantry squad best achieves overmatch through leader development enabled with operational level support, rather than simply through reorganizing or reequipping. In an attempt to ascertain how to enable the squad to win in future conflicts, shared understanding of exactly what the nondoctrinal term overmatch means must be established, as well as the expectations for the squad in future conflict. Additionally there must be an understanding of past attempts to reform the squad, as well as awareness of the current composition and disposition of the contemporary squad.
Contemporary examples of squads conducting operations in Afghanistan, from the 10th Mountain Division and 1st Infantry Division, who actually achieve overmatch in both combined arms 2 Richard M. Swain, Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy: First Commander, US Army, Training and Doctrine Command, 1 July 1973 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994) , 18. maneuver and wide area security operations, solidify the notion that overmatch through capability development is realistic. Analysis of the squads through comparison to the tenets of unified land operations, the Army's warfighting doctrine, indicates the value of a rifle squad to the overall success of the force. Finally, as composition still has a role in enabling a squad with overmatch, as technological advances continue to be necessary for battlefield success, insight into current projects integrating both capability and composition developments at the maneuver center of excellence will highlight recommendations to prioritize development of the capability, which will ensure success in future operations.
OVERMATCH AND DOCTRINE
As noted above, doctrine does not explain the concept of overmatch. As noted in one of the case study battalions to be referenced later, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry
Regiment during a January to December 2011 deployment to Afghanistan was distributed to fiftyeight remote locations across Afghanistan, and completed more than 10,000 missions as part of wide area security operations. 12 Other considerations such as force caps and budgetary restraints will certainly limit deployable forces. With an increasingly dispersed battle space, the squad will absorb greater areas of operation, and must be prepared to defeat the enemy, despite distance from higher headquarters or reinforcing elements.
Another expectation addressed by Training and Doctrine Command is the individuals that will compose the future threat forces. Squads will be expected to defeat an enemy who is fighting on terrain of their choosing. Colonel Jay Peterson, the assistant commandant of the Maneuver
Center of Excellence's Infantry School, described the challenge to be, "Our enemy is going to look like civilians, live and operate amongst civilians, and it will use the civilian population as a weapon system against us." 13 With an understanding that enemy forces will likely minimize U.S.
advantage in open terrain by utilizing urban areas filled with civilians as future battle zones, the squad will likely play the most important role as precision and target discretion will be required, to a degree that even smart-munitions cannot achieve. Finally, Training and Doctrine Command General Staff College, 2004) , 9.
Pamphlet 525-3-6 describes a fluid environment subject to rapid and radical change. The squad will have to be prepared to act rapidly, and potentially make decisions with strategic implications without consulting their higher headquarters. The reform that led the squad design from World War II to the contemporary squad is a result of a myriad of studies, each resulting in slightly different recommendations to enhance effectiveness of the squad, and none focusing on a desired capability, rather all results being directed at composition. The modern squad has its roots in the Infantry Conference at Fort Benning in 1946, which convened to consolidate lessons learned from World War II. Though the focus was on the division, one of the conclusions was that the rifle squad almost never employed tactical maneuvers in the attack, and a recommendation was made that the rifle squad should be recognized as a single fighting unit under the command of a single leader. This recommendation would lead to a reduction from a twelve-man squad to a nine-man squad, which was deemed more effective for command and control.
18 Thus, it would be with a nine-man squad that the U.S.
Army would fight the Korean War. In 1953, the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted an independent study called Operation Falcon, where they tested, then recommended a change to an eleven-man squad. However, the recommended changes were not implemented due to disagreement from the Infantry School, still convinced that a squad leader was unable to control an element of eleven soldiers. 19 In 1955, two studies were conducted. The 3rd Infantry Division conducted an exercise
named Follow Me, that tested the efficacy of a seven-man squad, and determined, based on consequences of attrition, inability to control without team leaders, and lack of firepower, that a seven-man squad was too small, and instead recommended that a squad should be composed of ten men. Also in 1955, an exercise was conducted at Camp Polk, again by the 3rd Infantry Division, to test the effectiveness of the nine-man squad, and this time determined that the nine-man squad was too small to conduct fire and maneuver, and recommended a return to a twelveman squad organized into a weapons team and two maneuver teams.
In 1956 This study concluded that the rifle squad should consist of ten-men, though augmented to eleven when operating from an armored personnel carrier. Additional findings were that the M60 machine gun should not be organic to the rifle squad, the fire teams did not need to be balanced, and all squads should habitually be supplied with the M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon. 22 In 1964 the Army conducted the Reorganization of the Army Division Study, which recommended a reduction in squad size to ten-men, primarily in an attempt to economize personnel in the Division, and used increased lethality from new weapons as justification. nine soldiers along with a driver and gunner. With more space inside the vehicle, squad capacity and capability increased as squads could carry gear in the vehicle, and tailor their load before dismounting. This "rolling arms room" concept increased squad lethality, as access to weapons systems that would have been too heavy to carry on long-duration missions existed in the vehicle that brought the squad to the battlefield.
One of the most prolific advantages an SBCT maintained over other formations was the digital systems organic to the brigade, which were doctrinally established to ensure a more rapid process of achieving situational understanding, and then allowing a commander to reposition forces to make contact with an enemy at a time and place of his choosing. 33 Thanks to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System that was installed in each infantry carrier vehicle, the rifle squad was able to have access to real time enemy information, and able to rapidly move to the fight. This new system was not significantly different than the Force XXI systems in that they showed units on a digital map and infantry squads lost contact with the information once they were dismounted. However, reliance on digital systems and the obvious benefit from enhanced understanding provided through the FBCB2, allowed for the introduction of a soldier level system, called the Land Warrior, to be which was finally fielded to an SBCT refined, all focused on increasing individual systems and adjusting manning as opposed to developing capabilities of the whole squad and organizing a formation starting at the top and going down -as opposed to establishing base capabilities and building up. The conflicting desire of balancing a squad that is small enough to be controlled by one leader, but large enough to remain combat effective after the loss of one of its members was of primary importance to the constant manning adjustments. Likewise, the desire to increase lethality by fielding increasingly more powerful weapons systems, like the M60 machine gun in the 1970s and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon in the 1980s, needed to be balanced against concerns regarding squad mobility and reach. The modernization of communications systems, first with radios then being brought into the network and "digitized" with the development for Force XXI and the SBCT, increased situational understanding for leadership above the squad, however, has not enhanced intra-squad capabilities. Finally, many of the adjustments to manning were more a result of adjustments to larger formations as opposed to maximizing the squad composition itself. The Army of Excellence design was based on a desire to achieve a certain manning quota across the Missing from all these studies was an attempt to develop capability based on improving cognitive skills of the individuals who make up the squad, or to increase capacity through enhanced training of the human dimension. As General DuPuy noted in his 1958 article, when in combat, a squad leader must decide on a course of action to achieve his objectives, and then organize his squad around a jointly held image of this course of action in sufficient detail to provide adequate instructions for each squad member. 38 targets using any munitions that require reflected laser energy for final ballistic guidance. 46 A sniper section, usually consisting of ten enlisted personnel, is able to deliver precise, long-range fire on selected targets and has a secondary mission of collecting and reporting on battlefield information. 47 They are usually organized into three, three-man teams, and are highly trained using their specific weapons systems. The combined sections could be considered highly trained infantry forces, with skills to employ unique capabilities.
The squadron operations officer characterized the element as "tactically flexible" and able to "maximize capabilities" of the squadron and be able to defend itself against an enemy attack. Additionally, the individual soldiers selected to create the kill team were hand-picked and described by the operations officer as "the most skilled… the best in the organization." would provide standoff from individual enemy soldiers. As these soldiers were described as "the best in the organization," they were likely highly trained and proficient at their individual soldier skills, and individually motivated. This kill team would be operating in a decentralized mode, dismounted and beyond the standard distance for dismounted element in the given terrain. 51 Ibid., 7.
squadron staff had requested. 52 The kill team's location was compromised, as an Afghan male looking at the observation post with binoculars was observed by a soldier on security. Though they knew they had been compromised, the options of attempting to move only to get ambushed on the way to their new location, or moving down the mountain only to cede the high ground to the enemy, were less preferable to staying at the observation post, and continuing to observe the targeted areas. valor demonstrated by a model Army leader. 55 The Kill Team had been able to achieve the objective of observing the named areas of intelligence, destroy a significant enemy force, and as they were required to execute a withdrawal, they demonstrated capability to plan, execute and support a further mission. The squad-sized element had achieved overmatch, primarily due to expert leadership and soldier resiliency, but also through the link to the fire support network.
First Squad Case Study
The prospect of achieving overmatch is easily conceivable for combined arms maneuver when enabled with assets such as fire support, but future conflict will likely not always require a heavy hand, and rifle squads will be expected to thrive in a wide area security environment as well. The second case study, demonstrating squad level overmatch in wide area security operations, focuses on 1st Squad, 4th Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (1-16 IN) "Iron Rangers", 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as described by Scott J. in December 2011, the villages that were secured and trained by the squad truly were able to take initiative to protect their own populations from insurgents.
SQUAD OVERMATCH AND UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
The two case studies indicate the capacity for a squad sized unit to achieve overmatch, primarily gained through metrics related to the human dimension, as opposed to any specific composition adjustment to the unit. Leadership, as demonstrated by SFC Monti and SSG Goggins, was decisive in the success of the units, and this dimension offers the greatest opportunity for achieving overmatch as opposed to any manning or equipment adjustment. A squad enabled with overmatch would be the most valuable contributor to conducting unified land operations, a concept built on the tenets of flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. When the case studies are analyzed according to these tenets of unified land operations, or the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and 71 Ibid., 141.
72 Ibid., 137.
operations, 73 it becomes apparent that the human dimension enhances the ability of a small unit to successfully execute critical tasks against projected threat forces across the operational spectrum, ultimately defeating the adversary, accomplishing operational objectives, and retaining capability to plan, execute, and support further missions, or achieve overmatch.
Flexibility, the first tenet of unified land operations, is facilitated through mission command which fosters individual initiative, and demands rapid action across the range of military operations. Squad leader and small unit flexibility was illustrated by SSG Goggins and First Squad when their mission changed from Iraq to Afghanistan, then were able to successfully operate with special operations forces conducting a mission they were not traditionally trained Integration is the second tenet. Army forces do not operate independently, but as part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Certainly this trend will continue in future operations. Army leaders are responsible for integrating Army operations within this larger effort. 75 Again, the human dimension is critical for integrating units into parent organizations. engagements and activities. 78 In these instances, the capability for the understanding of when to lawfully and expertly apply lethal force is of paramount importance to the success of a mission.
Obviously, this concept was clearly understood by SSG Goggins, as the solution for problems in Dandah Patan was not simply the application of physical destruction.
Adaptability will assuredly be required on future battlefields, as it requires understanding of the uniqueness of the operational environment. 79 Leaders will be required to adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face.
Mountcastle noted that the kill team mission was not overly complex: climb a mountain, establish an observation post, monitor the action below, and call for fires if necessary. 80 However the complexity increased with a sub-optimal observation location, casualties, a medical evacuation accident causing further casualties, and then the requirement to withdraw on foot as opposed to the original plan. Despite this increased complexity, the small unit was able to adapt to the conditions as they developed, and successfully complete their mission. First Squad required adaptability in the change of operational environment very early when ordered to Afghanistan, though all training had been for Iraq. Then the squad embracing the village stability operation as opposed to any standard combat mission demonstrated understanding of the requirements to achieve a position of advantage, and this concept, fostered in the human dimension, is critical for adaptability.
Depth, the fifth tenet, or the extension of operations in space, time, or purpose, will also be a consideration on the future battlefield. Tactical depth was demonstrated by the kill team, who had to move dismounted up a ridgeline, carrying in excess of fifty pounds of equipment, for three miles. Montcastle noted the terrain in northwestern Afghanistan was so treacherous that the brigade had suffered significant Soldier injuries and even deaths from falls in the mountains. 82 In such terrain, similar to restrictions in urban environments, squad sized units will be the only ones that will be able to navigate across.
Thus training, and developing the human dimension are essential for achieving both tactical and operational depth in similar, and expected, operational environments.
Synchronization, the sixth and final tenet, is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. At the tactical level, where an infantry squad operates, the synchronization of intelligence collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires leads to the destruction of an enemy force. 83 The kill team demonstrates tactical synchronization through the combination of snipers and a COLT element, which is able to accomplish all the required synchronization tasks. The capability organic to that squad-sized element contributes directly to obtaining overmatch over a threat force, and the human dimension allows for the unit to achieve the specific expertise, as well as successfully employ the methods in synchronization. First Squad contributed to operational synchronization, as it conducted specific tasks simultaneously with other units at a unique location, which overall for the battalion and the brigade, produced greater effects than each sub-element executing each task in isolation.
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As indicated by the two case studies of squad-sized organizations, enabling a squad with overmatch, through development of the human dimension, is not only plausible but critical to future success of the Army. The rifle squad can contribute to both tactical and operational level success, though focus must be directed at developing capability, initially through development of the human dimension, which will most effectively lead to overmatch. It is not surprising that in both case studies the Squad Leaders are described as being "the best," and it is not unrealistic to believe that focusing on the human dimension will result in all Squad Leaders exhibiting similar qualities to those of SFC Monti and SSG Goggins. There are, of course, composition enhancements that should contribute to overmatch as well, though their successful integration will rely on developing the human dimension first.
COMPOSITION AUGMENTS CAPABILITY
As LTG Brown notes in his article, "The Infantry Squad: Decisive Force Now and in the combination of improvements to network, mobility, protection, lethality, power generation, training, and leader development at the squad level. The identified critical needs for a squad to achieve overmatch were for it to be networked, have enhanced mobility, have enhanced force projection, be outfitted with improved power and energy capabilities, use joint fires and direct fires for increased lethality, and finally, greater focus on the human dimension, specifically training and leader development. Prioritization will be crucial in the near term for a force facing reduced budgets, and building squads with the necessary skills and confidence in abilities is important for establishing capability, then building on the capability with adjustments to composition. Brown recommends in the article that the best way to ensure that the Army accomplishes the directive of enabling a squad with overmatch, is through a consolidation of the current 466 programs that deal with improving some aspect of the squad, and treating the squad as a system during the acquisition process, in the same way that the force treats larger systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the littoral combat ship, or the Ford-class aircraft carrier. 86 This method to enhance composition will augment the focus on capability that will come from focusing on the human dimension. way to develop capacity is to focus on capability, or on developing the squad as a unit, focusing on the human dimension, specifically training and leader development. General William DePuy noted, in the March 1958 issue of Army that "you can't see an infantry squad -it is an idea that exists only when jointly held by its members." 87 The reliance on the training, experience, and leadership, or the human dimension that General DePuy was referring to is the building block for establishing overmatch at the infantry squad level. This will ultimately establish the basic element to build the rest of the force. This bottom-up approach is exactly what General Dempsey envisioned when he outlined his priorities, and it is likely that future conflict will depend on small units who are capable of success in both combined arms maneuver and wide area security missions. Assuredly, composition developments will come with the arrival of new technology, and will be important to ensuring that the squad can contribute to enhancing the operational and strategic commander's situational understanding with their networked information sharing.
However, these composition developments will rely on implementation developed by enhanced capability, which are founded on development of the human dimension. As then-President
Eisenhower wrote in a letter to Joseph L. Collins, "There has been much talk of air and sea winning a war, etc. -I honestly believe that, if we view the future with naked eyes, and reject all wishful thinking, we will find that the training, indoctrination, conditioning, equipping, and readying of our ground forces is possibly going to be an even more important thing in any future war than in the past."
